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ARE UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS ENTITLED TO A FRESH
START? AN ANALYSIS OF THE ELLIS STANDARD AND
POTENTIAL CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCES UNDER
18 U.S.C. § 152
ABSTRACT
Research and case law on U.S. bankruptcy law and how it applies to
undocumented immigrants is extremely sparse. There are currently over eight
million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., many of whom work “on-thebooks” jobs using false Social Security numbers (SSNs). These undocumented
workers contribute billions of dollars to the U.S. economy in the form of income,
property, and sales taxes—much of which is allocated to fund the U.S.’s social
safety net.
Although undocumented immigrants are eligible to file for bankruptcy
because they satisfy the definition of a “person” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(41), they
file at a much lower rate than their U.S. citizen counterparts. Many choose not
to file for bankruptcy because of a fear of deportation. Is this fear a warranted
one? Would petitioning for bankruptcy expose someone to unwanted
immigration consequences? Are there criminal consequences that
undocumented immigrants—and the attorneys whom advise them—should be
aware of before submitting a bankruptcy petition to the U.S. Trustee’s office?
This Comment primarily focuses on the latter question, analyzing whether
the use of a false SSN in obtaining employment is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152,
the criminal enforcement mechanism for bankruptcy violations. Multiple circuits
use the six-factor test outlined in U.S v. Ellis, a 1995 Seventh Circuit case, to
determine whether an action rises to the level of a convictable offense. In
analyzing this question, this Comment creates the character “Christina”—an
undocumented debtor in the U.S. who used her U.S. citizen cousin’s SSN on her
employment application—to determine whether her actions fall within the
purview of 18 U.S.C. § 152.
The inspiration for this analysis comes from the work of Chrystin
Ondersma—one of the few academics who has published works on the
intersection between bankruptcy and the lives of undocumented immigrants. In
her article, titled Undocumented Debtors, Ondersma stated that “[i]t is not
clear . . . that policing debtors’ use of false SSNs for employment purposes is
properly within the purview of bankruptcy officials and administrators,”
arguing that “[t]urning in a W-2 with a false SSN does not meet the elements of
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bankruptcy fraud [under 18 U.S.C. § 152] unless the debtor is seeking to
discharge debt relating to that SSN.” This Comment analyzes this argument
after being unable to find any case law or scholarship on the issue.
Additionally, this Comment looks at the issue of undocumented immigrants
filing for bankruptcy in a practical manner by (1) highlighting issues that may
arise in advising undocumented immigrants to file for bankruptcy and (2)
considering public policy in determining whether it would be in the best interest
of both undocumented immigrants and the U.S. to provide a pathway for all
“persons” to pursue bankruptcy without being deterred by fear of detention or
deportation. In sum, this Comment hopes to contribute to the nascent discussion
of the intersectionality of bankruptcy and immigration law and determine
whether the ubiquitous “fresh start” principle is a possibility for all persons.
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA)1—enacted on April 20, 2005—reformed the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(the Code) in an attempt “to emphasize ‘personal responsibility’ and to reduce
the number of people filing for bankruptcy[.]”2 One of the provisions of the Code
that BAPCPA amended was 11 U.S.C. § 521, which now requires a debtor to
disclose proof of income from all her sources, as well as “[E]vidence of payment
received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor
from any employer of the debtor[.]”3 Today, debtors disclose this information
and begin their bankruptcy petitions for the purpose of obtaining a “fresh start,”
a concept first articulated in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.4 There, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that bankruptcy gives “the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy,
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”5
Although Local Loan was decided during the U.S. Great Depression,
hundreds of thousands of debtors each year still seek a fresh start when falling
1

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23

(2005).
2
Stephen J. Spurr & Kevin M. Ball, The Effects of a Statute (BAPCPA) Designed to Make it More
Difficult for People to File for Bankruptcy, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 27, 27 (2013).
3
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(4) (2019).
4
See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); see also Margaret Howard, A Theory of
Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 (1987); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985).
5
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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upon hard times. In 2010, during the “Great Recession,” 1.5 million bankruptcy
petitions were filed in the U.S.—a number which decreased to about 776,000 in
2017.6 Although they do not file in significant numbers—for reasons discussed
infra—undocumented immigrants are among those who file bankruptcy.
In order to work in the “formal sector,” as opposed to working “off-thebooks” jobs where employees are paid in cash and there is virtually no paper
trail, many undocumented debtors use invented, purchased, or borrowed Social
Security Numbers (SSNs).7 Moreover, many undocumented immigrants are able
to secure credit and bank accounts either through the use of SSNs or Individual
Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs).8 Thus, an undocumented debtor
working in the formal sector and seeking to petition for bankruptcy postBAPCPA will have to show “evidence of payment received within 60 days
before the date of the filing of the petition,”9 which will likely come in the form
of pay stubs containing the invented, purchased, or borrowed SSN.
The Code does not discriminate on the basis of immigration status.10
Nevertheless, the use of an invented, purchased, or borrowed SSN may present
issues when an undocumented debtor seeks to file for bankruptcy. Although the
Code, which includes BAPCPA, is in Title 11 of the United States Code,11 the
criminal enforcement mechanism for bankruptcy is in chapter 9 of Title 18 of
the United States Code. Pertinent for the purposes of this Comment is 18 U.S.C.
§ 152(3), which imposes a punishment for any person “knowingly and
fraudulently mak[ing] a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement
under penalty of perjury . . . in relation to any case under title 11[.]”12
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit held that there are six elements the government
must prove to show a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3): “(1) a bankruptcy
proceeding existed under Title 11; (2) the defendant made a statement relating
to the proceeding; (3) the proceeding was under penalty of perjury; (4) the
statement related to a material matter; (5) the statement was false; and (6) the
statement was made knowingly and fraudulently.”13 In addition to being adopted

6
Statistics from Epiq Systems, AM. BANKR. INST., https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
7
Chrystin Ondersma, Undocumented Debtors, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 517, 542 (2012).
8
Id. at 52425.
9
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(4) (2019).
10
See generally 11 U.S.C. (2019).
11
Id.
12
18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2019).
13
U.S v. Ellis, 50 F.3d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 1995).
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by the lower federal courts in the Seventh Circuit,14 what will be referred to
hereafter as the “Ellis standard” has also been adopted by District Courts in the
Sixth15 and Tenth Circuits,16 the latter of which applied Ellis in 2017.
This Comment will explore whether the use of an invented, purchased, or
borrowed SSN is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152. For clarity, this Comment has
created the character “Christina.” Christina is an undocumented debtor in the
U.S. who used her U.S. citizen cousin’s SSN on her employment application
when she began working for her employer in the formal sector ten years ago.
Although she has gained her income by using her cousin’s SSN to obtain
employment, Christina obtained credit through the use of either (1) her ITIN or
(2) the methods available for undocumented immigrants to obtain credit
discussed infra. However, post-BAPCPA, Christina has fallen on tough times
and filed for bankruptcy in order to obtain a fresh start.
The SSN used by Christina will hereafter be referred to as “false,” but will
not be referred to as “borrowed” or “invented.” One of the definitions provided
by the Oxford Living Dictionary for “false” is “[n]ot according with truth or fact;
incorrect.”17 Here, Christina listed her cousin’s SSN on her employer’s
application which asked for her SSN—a written statement that is incorrect. The
verb “borrow” is defined as “[t]ak[ing] and us[ing] (something belonging to
someone else) with the intention of returning it[,]”18 while the verb “invent” is
defined as “[c]reat[ing] or design[ing] (something that has not existed
before)[.]”19 With regard to the former, it would be impossible for Christina to
“return” the SSN back to her cousin, as she already used it on her employment
application. In the latter case, Christina did not “create” something that did not
exist before. Instead, Christina appropriated her cousin’s SSN—which was
already in existence at the time—and used it as her own.
In determining whether Christina can, and should, be convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 152, this Comment will look at statutory interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 152, the Ellis standard, case law, and policy considerations. Since the Ellis
standard has been adopted in other circuits, analysis of case law will not be
limited to the Seventh Circuit. Instead, this Comment will look at holdings

14
Tucker v. Commander Packaging Ret. Plan for Hourly Emps., No. 12-C-5311, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146101, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
15
U.S. v. Kurlemann, No. 1:10-cr-14-3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94570, at *7 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
16
U.S. v. Yurek, No. 15-cr-394-WJM-1, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60346, at *56 (D. Colo. 2017).
17
False, LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/false (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
18
Borrow, LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/borrow (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
19
Invent, LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/invent (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
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across all U.S. federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, in arguing that
Christina should not be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 152.
The application of 18 U.S.C. § 152 to false SSNs has not yet been decided—
or even discussed—in case law. Thus, this Comment will cover an issue of first
impression and argue that Christina’s use of a false SSN does not satisfy the
Ellis standard because the second, fourth, and sixth elements are not satisfied. In
support of this argument, this Comment will first provide background
information about how undocumented immigrants acquire credit (and debt),
whether undocumented immigrants can petition for bankruptcy, and whether
they should submit a petition. The latter of these three will focus on the potential
immigration consequences that arise when advising undocumented clients to file
for bankruptcy. Next, this Comment will discuss the statutory and legal
framework to determine whether Christina has committed an offense that is
convictable under 18 U.S.C. § 152. This section will introduce us to Christina as
she files for bankruptcy and discuss the procedural hurdles she will face. Then,
the Ellis standard will be presented, and this Comment will make the case that
the government would face difficulty proving three of the six required elements.
After that, this Comment will present policy considerations showing that
undocumented immigrants should be entitled to the fresh start principle given
their contributions to the U.S. social safety net. Finally, this Comment will
conclude by summarizing the legal and practical implications of providing
undocumented immigrants unperturbed access to bankruptcy.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. How do Undocumented Immigrants Acquire Credit (and Debt)?
In lieu of using a SSN, undocumented immigrants in the U.S. have been able
to secure mortgages and credit through some banks by using their ITINs.20 With
the exception of U.S. visa and employment authorization card holders, a SSN
can only be issued to U.S. citizens (either after being born in the U.S. or
naturalized) or Permanent Residents.21 However, ITINs are issued by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to persons who are required to pay taxes but do
not have a SSN.22 This provides undocumented immigrants with a way to pay
20

Ondersma, supra note 7, at 52425.
See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPLICATION FOR A SOCIAL SECURITY CARD, https://www.
ssa.gov/forms/ss-5.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (a Permanent Resident has “lawful, work-authorized
immigration status” in the U.S.).
22
Jana Kasperkevic, The American Dream: How Undocumented Immigrants Buy Homes in the U.S.,
MARKETPLACE (Sept. 11, 2017, 7:03 AM), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/09/08/economy/american21
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the taxes they are required to pay, and receive taxes they are owed, without fear
of deportation, since “Tax information on ITIN holders is legally protected under
privacy laws and cannot be shared with the Department of Homeland Security
or Immigration and Customs Enforcement[.]”23 Although ITINs were initially
issued “[T]o enable tax payment by foreign nationals who are not eligible for a
[SSN] but own businesses or assets in the U.S.[,]” undocumented immigrants
have been able to use ITINs to obtain bank accounts, credit cards, and home
mortgages.24
It follows that undocumented immigrants who choose to obtain credit by
providing creditors with their ITINs can use this credit to make purchases and
acquire debt. According to a study in 2014, it was estimated that approximately
thirty-four percent of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. owned homes.25
Moreover, undocumented immigrants have also been able to use their ITINs, or,
in some instances, Matricula Consular cards (issued by the Mexican Consulate),
to obtain car loans.26
Undocumented immigrants may also be privy to less traditional ways of
securing credit, circumventing banks and credit card companies entirely. One
way this is done is by obtaining payday loans, which do not require a SSN but
charge annual interest rates of up to 1,000 percent.27 Creditors providing payday
loans “target immigrants both with and without lawful status[,]” and trap them
in a permanent cycle where all of the immigrant’s disposable income is used to
pay these creditors.28 Another common method of borrowing money, in Latinx
communities specifically, is a “tanda,” where a group of people contribute to a
pool of funds that are then used by members of that pool to secure loans.29
Through these avenues of obtaining credit, undocumented immigrants are
arguably more likely than their documented counterparts to fall behind on
payments to creditors and need a fresh start. This is especially true of
dream-how-undocumented-immigrants-buy-homes-us.
23
Hunter Hallman, How do Undocumented Immigrants Pay Federal Taxes? An Explainer, BIPARTISAN
POL’Y CTR., (Mar. 28, 2018).
24
See Kasperkevic, supra note 22.
25
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., PROFILE OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION: UNITED STATES, https://www.
migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
26
Ondersma, supra note 7, at 527.
27
Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking and Credit
Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 Mich. St. L. Rev. 989, 1008009 (2015).
28
Ondersma, supra note 7, at 527.
29
Id. at 52728; see also Shereen Marisol Meraji, Lending Circles Help Latinas Pay Bills and Invest,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/04/01/292580644/lendingcircles-help-latinas-pay-bills-and-invest.
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undocumented immigrants, who secure credit through organizations that
specifically target their communities knowing that these debtors will not be able
to pay back the exorbitant interest rates if they fall behind on payments.
Moreover, undocumented immigrants are also less likely to have health
insurance, which makes them more prone to accumulating medical debt. A study
released in 2017 found that forty-five percent of nonelderly undocumented
immigrants were uninsured, compared to just eight percent of nonelderly U.S.
born or naturalized citizens.30 This is unfortunate for undocumented immigrants,
as a medical debt is a “claim” as defined under the Code that can likely get
discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding.31
B. Filing for Bankruptcy as an Undocumented Immigrant
There is no requirement of lawful immigration status to file for bankruptcy
in the U.S.32 So long as an undocumented immigrant satisfies the definition of a
“person”33 in the Code, she may qualify as a “debtor.”34 Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”) 1007 requires an individual debtor, in
petitioning for bankruptcy, to submit a verified statement that sets out the
debtor’s social security number or states that the debtor does not have a SSN.35
This is done by completing and filing a Form B-121, which provides the
individual debtor with an option of checking a box confirming that she has
neither a SSN or an ITIN.36 Hence, neither a SSN or ITIN is required to file for
bankruptcy.
The main case supporting this proposition is In re Merlo,37 a matter
involving a Argentinian debtor who was neither a U.S. citizen or Permanent
30
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH COVERAGE OF IMMIGRANTS (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.kff.
org/disparities-policy/fact-sheet/health-coverage-of-immigrants/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
31
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), § 727(b) (2019).
32
Ondersma, supra note 7, at 518.
33
See § 101(41) (defining “person” to include an individual).
34
See § 101(13) (“The term ‘debtor’ means person or municipality concerning which a case under this
title has been commenced.”).
35
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(f).
36
OFFICIAL FORM, U.S. BANKR. COURT, FORM B-121: STATEMENT ABOUT YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBERS (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b121.pdf.
37
It is important to note that the debtor In re Merlo, 265 B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) filed a
chapter 13 bankruptcy, not chapter 7. However, I have not found any case law which limits In re Merlo’s
applicability strictly to chapter 13. To the contrary, multiple treatises suggest that the holding is not limited to
chapter 13. See 1 Collier Consumer Bankruptcy Practice Guide ¶ 16.06 (2018) (citing In re Merlo to support the
proposition that “the Code does not even require that the debtor have a social security number.”), 1 Collier
Pamphlet Edition 11 U.S.C. § 109 (16th ed. 2018) (citing In re Merlo to support the proposition that “[t]here is
no requirement that a debtor have a social security number to be eligible to file a bankruptcy case.”), 2 Collier
Pamphlet Edition F.R.B.P. 1005 (16th ed. 2018) (citing In re Merlo to support the proposition that “[a] debtor
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Resident and therefore did not have a SSN.38 The court reconciled 11 U.S.C.
§ 109—which “does not require a social security number as a condition of being
a debtor”39—with FBRP 1005, which “requires a debtor to list a social security
number in the[ir] bankruptcy petition.”40 The court first noted that “[t]he Rule
does not address the situation where a debtor without a social security number
files a bankruptcy petition.”41 Then, it noted that compliance with FBRP for
someone in Merlo’s position would be impossible.42 Finally, the court held that
FBRP 1005 did not prevent Merlo from becoming a debtor.43 The court
disagreed with the argument advanced by the Trustee—citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 342(c)44 and FRBP 2002(n)45—stating that the “failure of the Debtor to
provide a social security number results in the creditors having insufficient
information to identify the Debtor.”46 It reasoned that “the language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 342(c) specifically provides that the legal effect of the notice shall not be
invalidated.”47 Thus, “if a debtor does not have a social security number to list,
it does not prevent the petitioner from being a debtor under the Code.”48
Nevertheless, Form B-121 asks the debtor to list all SSNs and ITINs she has
used,49 and the U.S. Trustee has the discretion to—among other things—dismiss
the petition.50 Some states have local rules which require a petition to be
is not required by the Bankruptcy Code to have a social security number to be eligible for relief. Rule 1005
requires that if the debtor has a social security number, that number must be disclosed. When a debtor does not
have a social security number, the case may nonetheless proceed.”), 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 109.01 (16th ed.
2018), 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1005.01 (16th ed. 2018) (citing In re Merlo to support the proposition that
“[t]here is no requirement that an individual have a Social Security number in order to file a bankruptcy case.”),
9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1007.06 (16th ed. 2018) (citing In re Merlo to support the proposition that “[i]t is
important to note that the rule does not require that the debtor have a Social Security number or that the debtor
obtain a Social Security number. While the vast majority of individual debtors have Social Security numbers,
some do not. Indeed, some debtors who are eligible for relief are not able to obtain Social Security numbers.”).
38
In re Merlo, 265 B.R. at 503.
39
Id. at 503 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2019)).
40
Id. at 504; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(f).
41
In re Merlo, 265 B.R. at 504.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
11 U.S.C. § 342(c) (2019) (“If notice is required to be given by the debtor to a creditor under this
title . . . such notice shall contain the name, address, and last 4 digits of the taxpayer identification number of the
debtor.”).
45
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(n) (“The caption of every notice given under this rule shall comply with Rule
1005. The caption of every notice required to be given by the debtor to a creditor shall include the information
required to be in the notice by § 342(c) of the Code.”).
46
In re Merlo, 265 B.R. at 504.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
OFFICIAL FORM, U.S. BANKR. COURT, FORM B-121: STATEMENT ABOUT YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBERS (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b121.pdf.
50
Ondersma, supra note 7, at 557.
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dismissed if a SSN is not provided.51 Nevertheless, notwithstanding state law
and an assigned Trustee’s discretion, federal law permits undocumented
immigrants to file for bankruptcy.
C. Do Undocumented Immigrants File for Bankruptcy?
Although eligible under the Code, empirical data shows that undocumented
immigrants file for bankruptcy at a much lower rate than documented persons.
A study released in 2012 suggests that undocumented immigrants filed “for
bankruptcy at less than one percent of the rate of the general population.”52
Moreover, in an email survey sent to bankruptcy clerks earlier this decade, fiftyfive percent of the clerks noted that they were not aware of any case in their
district where a debtor filed without providing a SSN, while an additional fifteen
percent of the clerks responded that they only knew of one individual who had
filed for bankruptcy in their district without a SSN.53 Further, in a recent study
where fifty undocumented immigrants in New Mexico were interviewed, fortynine of the interviewees stated that they had never considered filing for
bankruptcy, while only one of the interviewees stated that he or she had
considered it.54
Fear of deportation is likely the main reason why undocumented immigrants
do not petition for bankruptcy. During the interviews with undocumented
immigrants in New Mexico mentioned above, sixty-eight percent of the
interviewees stated they felt they had been taken advantage of because they
lacked a SSN.55 However, when asked if they would feel comfortable using the
court system to pursue a remedy, over two-thirds of the interviewees either said
that they would not or that they were not sure.56 It follows that a person who is
unlikely to use the court system to pursue a remedy against another is also
unlikely to use the court system to discharge his or her personal liability to
creditors with claims against her.

51
See, e.g., D. MD. BANKR R. 1002-1 (“The petition will be dismissed without a hearing if . . . a voluntary
petition is filed without the debtor’s social security number being provided . . . .”); W.D. LA. LBR 1002-1
(Unless excused by order of the court, all petitions filed by an individual debtor shall include copies of . . . the
debtor’s social security card.”).
52
Ondersma, supra note 7, at 537.
53
Id.
54
Martin, supra note 27, at 1040 n.252.
55
Id. at 1040.
56
Id.
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D. Should Undocumented Immigrants File for Bankruptcy?
Although undocumented immigrants can file for bankruptcy, should they?
The hesitation of undocumented immigrants to use the courts to pursue a legal
remedy (such as bankruptcy) is warranted, as legal issues that are not
immigration-related in nature can present risk of detention or even deportation.
For example, an undocumented immigrant who is arrested for what the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)—located in 8 U.S.C.—refers to as a
“crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT), is then placed in removal
proceedings and is subject to deportation.57 In Georgia, the crime of shoplifting58
is considered a CIMT under the INA and could also be considered an aggravated
felony—another ground for removal—if the defendant’s plea states that she had
“intent to deprive,” and a sentence of at least one year of imprisonment may be
imposed.59 In contrast, having a defendant plead that she had “intent to
appropriate” does not make the crime an aggravated felony, and a CIMT
categorization can be avoided if the attorney asks the judge to impose a sentence
of less than a year (even if it is a suspended sentence) or “ask[s] [the] judge to
strike out [any] reference to jail term or confinement on [the] sentencing form
when [the] client is sentenced to probation.”60 Thus, there are serious
immigration concerns that attorneys should take into account when representing
undocumented immigrants in non-immigration matters.
It is not clear whether there is such a concern over bankruptcy matters
presenting immigration consequences, as I have been unable to find any sources
discussing the issue. There had previously been talk “of making the filing of a
bankruptcy a ‘sign of moral turpitude[,]’” but these discussions never amounted
to policy.61 Nevertheless, bankruptcy attorneys still face certain considerations
when advising undocumented clients. The U.S. Trustee Program—which
supervises the administration of cases filed under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 1362—
is an office within the Department of Justice (DOJ). Moreover, U.S. immigration
courts, which are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, are also

57

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d) (2018); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a) (2018).
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-14 (West 2017).
59
Sejal Zota & Dan Kesselbrenner, Selected Immigration Consequences of Certain Georgia Offenses,
PROJECT CITIZENSHIP (2013), http://projectcitizenship.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Georgia-Crimes-Chart.
pdf; see also Ga. Code Ann. § 16-8-14 (West 2017); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
60
Zota & Kesselbrenner, supra note 59.
61
Richard Parker, Not Born in the USA? The Perils of Bankruptcy Filings by Undocumented Persons,
PARKER, BUTTE & LANE, ATTORNEYS PC, http://pbl.net/resources/ (follow hyperlink; then, follow the “Not Born
in the USA?” hyperlink under “Parker, Butte & Lane Attorneys Expert Commentary”).
62
About the Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program (last updated
Mar. 6, 2019).
58
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part of the DOJ. However, the main law enforcement agency responsible for
enforcing immigration law within the country’s borders, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), is a part of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), which is separate from the DOJ.63
Although the U.S. Trustee and ICE are under separate organizations, their
separation does not ensure that they will not communicate with one another.
DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—which is, like the U.S.
Trustee’s Office, part of the DOJ—share information with one another through
the Secure Communities program.64 According to ICE: “For decades, local
jurisdictions have shared the fingerprints of individuals arrested and/or booked
into custody with the FBI to see if those individuals have a criminal record and
outstanding warrants.”65 However, under the Secure Communities Program,
which was re-enacted by an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump
in 2017, those fingerprints are then immediately sent to ICE.66 If it is determined
that the fingerprinted individual is undocumented, ICE then issues a detainer
request, asking the local law enforcement agency to hold the undocumented
immigrant for forty-eight hours so that ICE may pick them up and place them in
deportation proceedings.67
Currently, there are seventy-nine local law enforcement agencies in twentyone states that have an agreement with ICE to receive delegated authority for
immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions. 68 Through these
agreements, known as 287(g) agreements (named after the corresponding
section of the INA), ICE delegates many of their powers to local law
enforcement.69 Even if these local law enforcement agencies do not have 287(g)
agreements with ICE, they may still choose to cooperate with detainer requests.
In fact, as noted in Image 1 below, a large majority of local law enforcement
agencies cooperate with ICE in some form or fashion.

63

U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, WHO WE ARE, https://www.ice.gov/about (last updated Aug. 15,

2019).
64
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, SECURE COMMUNITIES, https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities
(last updated Mar. 20, 2018).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, IMMIGRATION DETAINER (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf.
68
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated Oct. 14, 2019).
69
National Map of 287(g) Agreements, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., https://www.ilrc.org/nationalmap-287g-agreements (last updated May 22, 2019).
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Image 1: Range of County Policies on Assisting ICE

70

Although similar mechanisms are not in place through which bankruptcy
courts or the U.S. Trustee’s office may cooperate with ICE, there is still a
possibility that this information could be shared upon request by ICE or the DOJ.
Consequently, attorneys should take into consideration the risk of sharing their
clients’ information with government entities. It should also be noted that having
an undocumented immigrant enter a federal building, such as a U.S. bankruptcy
court, may put said undocumented immigrant at risk. Federal courts are not “safe
spaces” for undocumented immigrants, as there have been numerous instances
of ICE agents arresting and detaining persons whom they suspect are
undocumented either inside or directly outside of courthouses,71 even in more

70
National Map of Local Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER,
https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map (last updated May 22, 2019).
71
See generally Kymelya Sari, Migrant LGBTQ Leader Faces Deportation After ICE Arrest at
Courthouse, SEVEN DAYS (Jan. 24, 2019, 11:14 AM), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/
2019/01/24/migrant-lgbtq-leader-faces-deportation-after-ice-arrest-at-courthouse.
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immigrant-friendly jurisdictions like Boston,72 Oregon,73 and Seattle.74 As was
done with Secure Communities, all that is needed for the U.S. Trustee and ICE
to cooperate with one another is an Executive Order or similar legislation passed
by Congress. This is not an impossibility, especially given the recent rise of
xenophobic attitudes in the U.S. (and throughout most of the Western world).75
This hostility toward immigrants in general—and undocumented
immigrants in particular—is reflected in a Proposed Rule published by DHS on
October 10, 2018.76 The Rule proposes to define the term “public charge,” a
term used in the INA as a ground of inadmissibility to the U.S.77 As it reads now,
the INA states that “Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the
time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the
time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to
become a public charge is inadmissible[,]”78 and can therefore be placed into
removal proceedings.79 However, the INA does not define what a “public
charge” is, and “in practice and under controlling case law the deportation
provision is rarely applied.”80
In the rare instances where public charge has been applied, only those noncitizens that had previously “[taken] cash welfare[,] known as Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, or Supplemental Security Income . . .” would
have been at risk of being defined as a “public charge.”81 However, under the
new Proposed Rule, “government officials would ultimately be required to deny
72
See Maria Cramer, ICE Arrest at Suffolk Court Rankles New DA, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 22, 2019, 8:33
PM).
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/21/ice-arrest-suffolk-courthouse-raises-hacklesnew/XCZWXr
JOreGAuxGidDtiPN/story.html.
73
Parker, supra note 61.
74
See Neal McNamara, ICE Arrests Man at Seattle Court, A Troubling Tactic for Judges, PATCH (Jan.
23, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://patch.com/washington/seattle/ice-waited-outside-seattle-municipal-court-arrestman.
75
See Simon Tisdall, Rise of Xenophobia Is Fanning Immigration Flames in EU and US, THE GUARDIAN
(June 22, 2018, 7:56 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/as-immigration-crisis-explodesxenophobes-gain-ground-in-eu.
76
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018).
77
Id.
78
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2019).
79
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2019).
80
Ben Harrington & Audrey Singer, Cong. Research Serv., R45313, Immigration: Frequently Asked
Questions about “Public Charge” 1 (updated Sept. 19, 2018) (citing Dep’t of Just., Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv., Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28689,
28692 (May 26, 1999) (“Deportations based on public charge grounds have been rare.”)).
81
See Shefali Luthra, 5 Things To Know About Trump’s New ‘Public Charge’ Immigration Proposal,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 25, 2018), https://khn.org/news/5-things-to-know-about-trumps-new-publiccharge-immigration-proposal/.
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a green card and most other visas to anyone who they predict may, at any point
in the future, receive supplementary forms of public assistance . . . .”82 Thus, if
DHS becomes privy to information indicating that someone is in the U.S.
without legal status, a previous bankruptcy filing may create a presumption that
said individual may be—or may become—a public charge. Moreover, the
proposed expansion of the public charge ground may also affect an
undocumented immigrant should she find a ground to obtain permanent
residence, as the new rule could penalize permanent residence applicants who
had previously used Medicaid, “food stamps, Section 8 rental assistance and
federal housing vouchers . . . .”83
There is also a possibility that U.S. citizens or Permanent Residents who
petition on behalf of an alien relative may be liable if that alien becomes a public
charge.84 In applying for a visa or to become a Permanent Resident, aliens are
required to submit an Affidavit of Support (Form I-864) (the Affidavit).85 This
Affidavit is filled out by a qualifying relative—referred to as the alien’s
“sponsor” or “petitioner”—who agrees to “accept legal responsibility for
financially supporting” the alien.86 The Affidavit “is a legally enforceable
contract, and the sponsor’s responsibility usually lasts until the family member
or other individual either becomes a U.S. citizen, or is credited with 40 quarters
of work (usually 10 years).”87 The form is submitted “to show that [the alien]
ha[s] the financial means to live in the United States without needing welfare or
financial benefits from the U.S. government.”88 Although the public charge
inadmissibility ground has been seldom enforced,89 the Proposed Rule’s
bolstering of this ground gives reason to believe that that these Affidavits may
be reviewed going forward to determine whether a sponsored alien has become
a public charge.90

82
Shawn Fremstad, Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule Would Radically Change Legal Immigration, CTR.
AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/
2018/11/27/461461/trumps-public-charge-rule-radically-change-legal-immigration/.
83
Luthra, supra note 81.
84
Parker, supra note 61.
85
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., PUBLIC CHARGE, https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/public-charge
(last updated Aug. 12, 2019).
86
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT, https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/
affidavit-support (last updated June 14, 2019).
87
Id.
88
PUBLIC CHARGE, supra note 85.
89
Em Puhl, et. al., An Overview on Public Charge, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (2018),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/overview_of_public_charge-20181214.pdf.
90
See generally Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018).

FOR

UPDATEDRIVERAPROOFS_4.30.20

2020]

ANALYSIS OF THE ELLIS STANDARD

5/12/2020 2:27 PM

193

A Final Rule that prescribes “how DHS will determine whether an alien
applying for admission or adjustment of status is inadmissible to the United
States under section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or
the Act), because he or she is likely at any time to become a public charge” was
published on August 14, 2019 and took effect on October 15, 2019.91
E. Potential Issues in Advising Undocumented Debtors
Currently, there is no requirement that an attorney provide a client with
accurate information regarding the immigration consequences (if any) of filing
for bankruptcy. However, a relatively recent holding by the U.S. Supreme Court
in the criminal context may one day be applicable to other types of law practices,
including bankruptcy. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v.
Kentucky, a case involving a permanent resident who faced deportation as a
result of pleading guilty to a drug trafficking charge.92 Padilla stated “that his
counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering
the plea . . .”, but also provided him with incorrect information about the
immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a drug trafficking charge.93
Moreover, Padilla argued “that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had
not received incorrect advice from his attorney.”94 The Court held that
“counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’”95 Hence, Padilla’s representation by counsel was
constitutionally deficient and therefore violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as interpreted in the Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington.96 The
Court also held “that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a
risk of deportation.”97 The Court based this holding on “longstanding Sixth
Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a
criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living
lawfully in this country . . . .”98
The Sixth Amendment only applies to criminal cases.99 Therefore, the
holdings in Padilla and Strickland do not apply to bankruptcy proceedings.
91

Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Oct. 15, 2019).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 366.
96
Id. at 369.
97
Id. at 374.
98
Id.
99
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.”).
92
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However, an attorney may be found liable as a matter of civil law if her conduct
rises to the level of legal malpractice.100 The elements of legal malpractice are:
“[A] duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty,
and injury to the plaintiff as a proximate result of the breach.”101 The minimum
standard of care is determined “by the degree of departure from customary
professional conduct[,]” defined as “the minimum quality of professional
conduct ‘customarily’ provided by the members of that profession.”102 Although
the Court in Padilla left the issue of relief to the lower court on remand,103
applying the principles of Padilla as they related to legal malpractice in the
bankruptcy context is justifiable for two reasons. First, it is not far-fetched to say
that it should be “customary” for bankruptcy attorneys to advise their clients on
potential immigration consequences. However, there is no information on
whether this is actually the customary practice in bankruptcy given the sparse
number of undocumented immigrants who file for bankruptcy. Second, Padilla
is analogous to the bankruptcy context—and many other legal practice areas—
as it relates to undocumented immigrants because the rationale for providing
accurate immigration advice is identical. The principles enumerated in the
Court’s opinion in Padilla—longstanding precedent, the seriousness of
deportation, and the impact of deportation of families104—would also apply in
the bankruptcy context should an undocumented immigrant find herself
deportable on public charge grounds or if she is detained by ICE at her local
bankruptcy court.
II. STATUTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In determining whether our case study, Christina, can be convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 152, statutory law, case law, and policy implications
should
be
considered. Each of these is analyzed below, as this Comment navigates through
Christina’s journey filing for bankruptcy as an undocumented immigrant who
previously worked in the formal sector with a false SSN. This analysis also
presumes the following: (1) Christina has not worked for another employer since
she arrived in the U.S.; (2) Christina has an ITIN that she uses to obtain credit;
(3) Christina has not used her false SSN to obtain credit; (4) there is no
100

See Martin T. Fletcher, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 772 (1968).
Id. at 773 (citing Ishmael v. Millington, 243 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Eckert v.
Schaal, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Cal. App. 1967)).
102
Martin T. Fletcher, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 773 (1968) (citing
Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); Leverman v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); W. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS § 4 at 59 (1953); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 32 at 164–68 (3d ed. 1964)).
103
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
104
Id. at 37374.
101
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dischargeable debt associated with this SSN; (5) Christina resides in a state that
allows a debtor who does not have a SSN to file for bankruptcy; and (6)
notwithstanding her use of a false SSN, Christina has not made any
misrepresentations as to the other requirements in BAPCPA.
A. Navigating Statutory Law and Filing for Bankruptcy as an Undocumented
Immigrant
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts . . . .”105 Thus, undocumented immigrants have the right to
enter into contracts with creditors.
Presume that Christina has entered into contractual agreements with a few
creditors. Each of these contractual agreements states that she is liable for all
debt incurred within the scope of the agreement. Christina has fallen behind on
payments to her creditors and would like to seek a fresh start. She conducts
research online and discovers that the debts to her creditors can likely be
discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Consequently, Christina decides to file for chapter 7 pro se in the state in
which she resides. Prior to submitting her petition, Christina discovers that, in
addition to submitting a Form B-121 with her petition,106 she must also disclose
“evidence of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the
petition, by the debtor from any employer of the debtor[.]”107 Failure to provide
these records within forty-five days of the date the petition is filed will result in
an automatic dismissal of the petition.108 Christina lists her ITIN number on
Form B-121 and also correctly lists her false SSN on the form. She also obtains
and completes all of the requisite documents listed in 11 U.S.C. § 521 and visits
her local federal bankruptcy court to file her petition. Upon review of Christina’s
Form B-121, the U.S. Trustee decides not to dismiss her petition.
The U.S. Trustee convenes a meeting of creditors (a “341 meeting”) under
her statutory authority.109 According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees, “[w]hen debtors state that they are not eligible
for a social security number, the trustee must inquire further in order to verify

105
106
107
108
109

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2019).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(f).
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2019).
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).
See 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (2019).
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identity.”110 However, an ITIN is considered “acceptable documentation.”111
Consequently, the U.S. Trustee decides to not dismiss Christina’s petition.
Christina has been able to satisfy the requirements to petition under the
Code. However, an issue may present itself if criminal charges are levied against
her under 18 U.S.C. § 152 for providing pay stubs that contain her false SSN, as
this statute imposes a punishment for any person “knowingly and fraudulently
mak[ing] a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty
of perjury . . . in relation to any case under title 11[.]”112
It is important to note that Christina, as someone who works in the formal
sector, receives documentation of payment from her employer in the form of pay
stubs. However, those who work in the “informal sector” do not likely have
access to documentation from their employer that will satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 521,
and therefore should not file for bankruptcy.113 Consequently, the analysis of
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 152 will be limited to how the statute applies to
undocumented debtors working in the formal sector who have filed for
bankruptcy.
B. Case Law
Case law pertaining to undocumented immigrants in bankruptcy is
extremely sparse. This is likely a result of the barriers to filing bankruptcy for
undocumented immigrants discussed supra, along with the fear of deportation
that comes with providing identifying information in a government proceeding.
Given the lack of precedent—since Christina’s situation is one of first
impression—it is necessary to provide a framework to analyze whether she
should be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 152. The Ellis standard provides this
framework, by listing six elements the government has to prove to show a
violation of the statute: “(1) a bankruptcy proceeding existed under Title 11; (2)
the defendant made a statement relating to the proceeding; (3) the proceeding
was under penalty of perjury; (4) the statement related to a material matter; (5)
the statement was false; and (6) the statement was made knowingly and
fraudulently.”114 It is clear through the conjunctive “and” that each element has
to be met in order to convict someone under this statute.
110
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES, at 3-5 to 3-6 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/handbook_for_chapter_7_trustees.pdf/download.
111
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012)).
112
18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2019). The Ellis Court cited 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1996); this recently updated
version contains identical language.
113
See Ondersma, supra note 7, at 542.
114
U.S v. Ellis, 50 F.3d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
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Given how precisely the Court in Ellis detailed what a conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 152 would require, as well as its recent adoption in multiple circuits,
this Comment will apply the Ellis standard in its discussion. More specifically,
the discussion will analyze whether an undocumented immigrant working in the
formal sector who submits pay stubs containing a false SSN within the required
forty-five-day period to submit proof of employment documents under 11
U.S.C. § 521(i) satisfies all six elements of 18 U.S.C. § 152.115
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 152
The In re May court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 152 to be “a congressional
attempt to cover all of the possible methods by which a debtor or any other
person may attempt to defeat the intent and effect of the bankruptcy law through
any type of effort to keep assets from being equitably distributed among
creditors.”116 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v. Key, seven years before
Ellis was decided, noted that “the essence of the offense under § 152 is the
making of a materially false statement or oath with the intent to defraud the
bankruptcy court . . . .”117 Both of these interpretations lend themselves to
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 152 to be applicable to a broad array of acts by the
debtor. The May case uses the language “all of the possible methods” by a debtor
to “defeat the intent and effect of bankruptcy” to describe what it believed was
Congress’s intent in enacting the statute.118 The interpretation in Key is also
broad, as it was written as a response rejecting the defendant’s argument that the
government failed to prove certain elements to satisfy the statute. Additionally,
the court in Ellis, citing Key, noted that the statute’s scope “reaches beyond the
wrongful sequestration of a debtor’s property and also encompasses the knowing
and fraudulent making of false oaths or declarations in the context of a
bankruptcy proceeding.”119
Neither of these interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 152 would be applicable to
Christina. Regarding the interpretation in May, the court’s broad language of
“all of the possible methods” is limited—in that same sentence—to those which
a debtor acts on to “keep assets from being equitably distributed among

115
116
117
118
119

11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2019).
In re May, 12 B.R. 618, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
United States v. Key, 859 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1988).
In re May, 12 B.R. at 625.
Ellis, 50 F.3d at 423 (citing Key, 859 F.2d 1257 at 125960).
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creditors.”120 In providing a pay stub containing a false SSN, Christina is not
keeping her assets from being distributed per chapter 7’s distribution
mechanism.121 The only issue arising for Christina under this interpretation
would be if she made a misrepresentation as to the other requirements in 11
U.S.C. § 521.122 This statute states that Christina must provide certain schedules
and statements related to her assets, liabilities, income, expenditures, and
financial affairs.123
The interpretation of the “essence” of the statute, provided in Key, may apply
depending on what is considered “a materially false statement or oath.”124 In
Ellis, the court held that the defendant’s “[F]ailure to list his prior bankruptcies”
constituted a false statement.125 The application of Ellis to undocumented
debtors will be discussed infra, but it is worth mentioning that the “statements”
made by the defendant in Ellis and Christina are distinguishable, as Christina’s
statement—submitting pay stubs containing a false SSN—was a submission of
documents necessary for her petition. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Ellis,
Christina admitted to using a false SSN, leaving it to the U.S. Trustee’s
discretion whether to dismiss her case.
Even if Christina’s submission of her pay stubs constitutes a “false”
statement, the language of both the case law and the statute require that the
statement be “material.” The Oxford Living Dictionary defines material as
“significant or relevant, especially to the extent of determining a cause or
affecting a judgement.”126 Although the court in Ellis does not discuss
materiality, the defendant’s use of false SSNs was certainly both significant and
relevant.127 In Ellis, the submission of a false SSN defrauded the bankruptcy
court by allowing the defendant to avoid 11 U.S.C. § 727’s prohibition of filing
a bankruptcy petition up to eight years after receiving a discharge.128 In contrast,
because Christina did not acquire her debt through the use of her SSN, none of
her submission of pay stubs containing false SSNs is neither significant nor
relevant.

120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Cf. In re May, 12 B.R. at 625.
See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2019).
See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2019).
Id. It has been presumed that Christina has not misrepresented this information.
United States v. Key, 859 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1988).
United States v. Ellis, 50 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1995).
Material, LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/material (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
See Ellis, 50 F.3d 419.
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2019).
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Further, although Ellis did not overrule Key, the Ellis standard appears to
alter how to assess whether someone has violated 18 U.S.C. § 152. In Key, the
Court rejected a categorical approach to determining whether the government
met their burden in proving a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152 in favor of a broader
approach in which the government solely had to prove the “[M]aking of a
materially false statement or oath . . . .”129 However, Ellis, which cites Key,
created a specific and extensive categorical standard to assess whether the
government has met its burden of proof.130 Although both cases are still good
law, courts should prefer a standard that protects the due process rights of
criminal defendants: forcing the government to satisfy all elements of a charge
to secure a conviction.
B. Applying Ellis to Undocumented Immigrants
The defendant in Ellis was charged and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 152 for
not listing his prior bankruptcies.131 The court’s analysis in determining whether
the government had met its burden of proof focused on (1) whether an omission
constituted a false statement and (2) whether the defendant had a knowing or
fraudulent intent.132 The first element is irrelevant, as Christina has not made an
omission. Thus, we will only discuss Ellis’s holding as it pertains to the second
element.
In determining the defendant’s intent, the Court in Ellis noted that “[i]ntent
to defraud the bankruptcy court is required to sustain a conviction under
§ 152.”133 Moreover, in deciding whether the jury’s decision to convict the
defendant, the court reiterated that “a totality of the circumstances” should be
considered in determining the defendant’s intent.134 These circumstances should
be “[E]valuated in the light most favorable to the government . . . .”135 Further,
solely the use of “circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the fraudulent
intent required to secure a conviction under § 152.”136 In analyzing the
defendant’s intent under this standard, and applying the Ellis standard, the court
held that the jury did not err in convicting him.137

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Key, 859 F.2d at 125960.
See Ellis, 50 F.3d at 422.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426.
Id.
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A court applying the Ellis standard would not convict Christina under this
statute. In addition to the elements of the Ellis standard not being met (for
reasons discussed below), Christina had no intent of defrauding the bankruptcy
court. Rather, she—like many debtors, regardless of legal status—sought to be
relieved of her pre-petition debts and be awarded a fresh start. In doing so, she
submitted documents containing a false SSN. Nevertheless, in addition to
submitting her pay stubs, Christina also listed her false SSN on her Form B-121.
This suggests she had the intention of being transparent, not to defraud the court.
Further, Christina’s filing for bankruptcy does not constitute fraud because she
is a “person” under the Code.138 Consequently, under the Code, she can qualify
as a “debtor.”139 Therefore, a court considering a totality of the circumstances
should dismiss an 18 U.S.C. § 152 claim against Christina.
In considering the totality of the circumstances, courts should concurrently
consider whether all elements of the Ellis standard have been met. Under this
standard, the government has to satisfy the following elements to meet its burden
of proof: “(1) a bankruptcy proceeding existed under Title 11; (2) the defendant
made a statement relating to the proceeding; (3) the proceeding was under
penalty of perjury; (4) the statement related to a material matter; (5) the
statement was false; and (6) the statement was made knowingly and
fraudulently.”140 In our hypothetical, the government satisfies the first element
since Christina filed a chapter 7 petition. Moreover, the government satisfies the
third element since Christina filed a bankruptcy proceeding under penalty of
perjury.141 Further, Christina made a false statement, and therefore concedes the
fifth element of the Ellis standard. However, the government does not meet its
burden of proof in Christina’s case since it will not be able to satisfy the second,
fourth, and sixth elements of the Ellis standard. These elements are discussed
below.
1. A Statement Related to a Proceeding
18 U.S.C. § 152 covers “[F]alse declaration[s], certificate[s], verification[s],
or statement[s]” in a Title 11 matter.142 Thus, one must consider whether
Christina’s submission of pay stubs containing a false SSN falls into any of
§ 152’s categories. § 152 does not explicitly mention pay stubs.143 However, pay
138
139
140
141
142
143

See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2019).
See § 101(13).
Ellis, 50 F.3d at 422.
See FED. R. EVID. 603 (2011).
See 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2019).
See 18 U.S.C. § 152.
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stubs fall under 11 U.S.C. § 521, which requires a debtor to submit “[E]vidence
of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition,
by the debtor from any employer of the debtor[.]”144 11 U.S.C. § 521 does not
refer to these types of documents using any of the terms (“statement,”
“declaration,” “certificate,” or “verification”) in 18 U.S.C. § 152. Thus, because
pay stubs are not explicitly listed in 18 U.S.C. § 152 and it is unclear whether
they can be labeled “statements,” “declarations,” “certificates,” or
“verifications,” it is reasonable to conclude that pay stubs are not within the
purview of 18 U.S.C. § 152.
However, if determined that the submission of pay stubs containing a false
SSN falls under 18 U.S.C. § 152, whether Christina’s submission of pay stubs
containing a false SSN relates to her chapter 7 proceeding has three
interpretations. The first interpretation is that pay stubs are submitted under 11
U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) since they are “evidence of payment . . . from any
employer of the debtor.”145 Without evidence of payment, a bankruptcy petition
cannot proceed.146 Thus, pay stubs relate to the bankruptcy proceeding. The
second interpretation is that pay stubs are out of the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 152
because they are not identified under 11 U.S.C. § 521 as either a statement,
declaration, certificate, or verification. The third interpretation is that pay stubs
fall under the “verification” category, since the submission of them in a petition
verifies the debtor’s payment from his employer during the sixty-day range.
Since all of these are reasonable interpretations, we cannot confidently
determine whether this factor weighs for or against Christina. Nevertheless, this
factor is not dispositive, and both the fourth and sixth elements listed in the Ellis
standard weigh in favor of Christina.
2. The Statement is Related to a Material Matter
In its discussion of materiality, the Ninth Circuit held in U.S. v. O’Donnell
that “[m]ateriality does not require a showing that creditors are harmed by the
false statements.”147 The Court further noted that the scope of materiality
includes: (1) matters relating to the extent and nature of the bankrupt’s assets;
(2) inquiries relating to the bankrupt’s business transactions or his estate; (3)
matters relating to the discovery of assets; (4) the history of a bankrupt’s
financial transactions; and (5) statements designed to secure adjudication by a

144
145
146
147

11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2019).
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).
United States v. O’Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976).
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particular bankruptcy court.148 Moreover, in U.S. v. Phillips, the Ninth Circuit
found that the debtor providing four false statements—one of which involved
listing a false SSN—in her bankruptcy petition, constituted a material matter.149
In addition to not requiring the government to show creditors’ harm as a result
of a false statement, a matter is material if it is “pertinent to the extent and nature
of bankrupt’s assets, including the history of a bankrupt’s financial
transactions.”150
In 2002, a Ninth Circuit district court considered a bankruptcy court’s
interpretation of Phillips as it pertained to the materiality of a debtor’s omission
of her SSN and the use of fabricated SSNs in filing for chapter 7 in In re
Guadarrama. There, the bankruptcy court held that the Trustee failed to prove
that the debtor’s failure to disclose her true SSN was a material
misrepresentation.151 It reasoned that the debtor’s “listing of false Social
Security numbers and failure to disclose her actual SSN was not material
because an investigation of her valid SSN would not have revealed information
that would have resulted in denying her a discharge.”152 The debtor also argued
that the omission of her valid SSN was not material because it was not used to
“incur any pre-petition debt.”153 However, the district court reversed, reasoning
that the debtor’s use of false SSNs in her petition “[M]ay have been validly
issued to other individuals, whose credit was impaired by her use of them to
obtain a bankruptcy discharge.”154 The court further reasoned that the debtor’s
omission of her valid SSN was material because the debtor’s “[F]ailure to
disclose valid Social Security information impeded the Trustee’s ability to
determine her eligibility for discharge.”155
The Ninth Circuit provides a broad interpretation of materiality,
encompassing both submissions and omissions that may affect a bankruptcy
proceeding. As the court in In re Guadarrama reasoned, “Materiality is judged
not by the actual effect of the fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment,
however, but by the effect it was capable of producing.”156

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 123738.
United States v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 884, 88687 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 887.
In re Guadarrama, 284 B.R. 463, 468 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
In re Guadarrama, 284 B.R. at 475 (Emphasis in original).
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Notwithstanding this broad interpretation, which is the most favorable to the
government across all the U.S. circuits, Christina’s submission of pay stubs
containing a false SSN would not satisfy this element. Christina’s submission
fits within the scope of materiality, as it is defined in O’Donnell, since her
paystubs relate “to the extent and nature” of her assets and this submission was
made to “secure adjudication by a particular bankruptcy court.”157 Moreover,
although Christina’s use of a false SSN does not harm any of her creditors—
since the debt she is seeking relief from was not acquired by using her SSN—
harm to creditors is not required to prove materiality.158
Nevertheless, the submission of Christina’s pay stubs in applying for chapter
7 can be distinguished from the debtors in Phillips and Guadarrama. In the
former case, the court—citing O’Donnell—determined that the debtor’s
submission of a false SSN in applying for bankruptcy was material, reasoning
that “[T]he false social security number might have impeded an investigation
into the appellant’s financial history, and might have misled creditors as to the
identity of the petitioner.”159 Hence, Phillips proposes that the actual danger, and
therefore the materiality of a statement or omission, rest on its ability to harm
creditors or hinder a proper investigation of a debtor’s assets. Neither of these
dangers are present in Christina’s case, since she listed her false SSN on her
Form B-121. By doing this, Christina gave the U.S. Trustee the discretion to
either investigate the assets and debts related to that SSN or dismiss the
petition.160
Similarly, in Guadarrama, Christina’s submission of her paystubs did not
impede “[T]he Trustee’s ability to determine her eligibility for discharge,” since
the false SSN was made available to the trustee through her Form B-121.161
Therefore, the only way Christina’s use of a false SSN would have been
“capable” of affecting a bankruptcy proceeding materially is if the Trustee,
through her discretion, decided not to look into the SSN provided by Christina.
Further, the Guadarrama court in reversing the bankruptcy court’s holding was,
in part, concerned with the impact on the credit of the true holder of the SSN.162
This danger does not exist in Christina’s situation for two reasons. First,
Christina did not use her false SSN in petitioning for bankruptcy—since she
listed her ITIN number on her Form B-121 and only listed her false SSN when
157
158
159
160
161
162

United States v. O’Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976).
See O’Donnell, 539 F.2d at 1237–38; see In re Guadarrama, 284 B.R. at 475.
United States v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1979).
See Ondersma, supra note 7, at 556–57.
In re Guadarrama, 284 B.R. at 475.
See id.
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asked on the Form to provide all SSNs and ITINs she has used.163 As a result,
Christina sought to be discharged from the debt associated her ITIN, not her
false SSN. Second, an inquiry into the false SSN would show that there is no
dischargeable debt associated with it—as we presumed earlier in the
introduction of Part C. Therefore, there would be no chapter 7 discharge
associated with this SSN that would affect the valid holder of the SSN’s credit.
It follows that Christina’s submission of pay stubs containing a false SSN, along
with her listing this SSN on her Form B-121, does not constitute a material
misrepresentation or omission.
However, should Christina’s submission of pay stubs containing a false SSN
constitute a material representation under the Ellis standard, the court should
take an approach similar to that of the court in In re Riccardo.164 There, Mr.
Riccardo listed a different SSN on his bankruptcy petition than on his Social
Security card and on his tax returns after being “apprised by prior counsel of the
importance of using correct social security numbers . . . .”165 Although the court
recognized that Mr. Riccardo’s use of a different SSN than what was on his
Social Security card was material, the court dismissed his petition without
prejudice, provided that the court’s decision “be served upon all creditors on the
debtors’ matrix and the three credit reporting agencies” and Riccardo “be
required to disclose in any new filing all prior identities or social security
numbers used, as well as this decision.”166 The court reasoned, that in the event
Mr. Riccardo filed a subsequent bankruptcy petition, the creditors could
successfully get the petition dismissed.167 Elaborating on this point, the court
stated:
[S]ome creditors may object to discharge, either successfully or not,
and many creditors will do nothing. That is their choice. But in any
event, both the debtors and their creditors will have the opportunity to
have their day in court on the issue of dischargeability, with the benefit
of such disclosure as is provided in this decision.168

In its decision, the court exposed the failure of the Trustee assigned to this case,
because the U.S. Trustee had discretion to dismiss the case when it became
known that Riccardo used a false SSN. Nevertheless, the court dismissed

163
See OFFICIAL FORM, U.S. BANKR. COURT, FORM B-121: STATEMENT ABOUT YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBERS (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b121.pdf.
164
See In re Riccardo, 248 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
165
Id. at 719.
166
Id. at 725.
167
See id.
168
Id.
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without prejudice and balanced the equities between debtors and creditors,
stating that:
[I]n this case creditors generally may be harmed by a ‘rush to
judgment’ (which the Bankruptcy Code precludes in order to preserve
equality among creditors) and even swift creditors may not benefit if
the Riccardos are barred from refiling, whereas the Riccardos
desperately need a fresh start, if they can get it.169

3. The Statement Was Made Knowingly and Fraudulently
In Ellis, the debtor argued that the prosecution failed to prove that his
omissions were not the result of mistakes by either the debtor or his attorneys.170
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence “to prove the fraudulent intent required to secure a
conviction under § 152.”171 Since Ellis, courts in multiple districts have held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove fraudulent intent.172
Before analyzing whether there is enough circumstantial evidence for the
government to satisfy this element with regard to Christina, it is important to
look at other cases where circumstantial evidence satisfied this element. In Ellis,
the debtor’s knowing and fraudulent intent was proven with evidence showing
that he previously filed for bankruptcy eight times and used four different SSNs
in those filings.173 Since the disclosure of these bankruptcies would have made
the debtor ineligible for the relief he was seeking, the court concluded that the
debtor “possessed a strong motive to conceal fraudulently his prior bankruptcies
from the court.”174 In Matter of Extradition of Lehming, which involved the
extradition of a German national for committing an offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 152, a district court in the Third Circuit defined “knowingly” as a
volitional act that does not require the person doing the act to know that she is
breaking the law.175 Notwithstanding this broad definition, the court found that
this element was not satisfied because the government did not provide any direct
or circumstantial evidence proving that the defendant made the statements in
169

Id.
United States v. Ellis, 50 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1995).
171
Id. (citing United States v. Goodstein, 883 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1989)).
172
See United States v. Mitchell, No. 05-CR-50-LRR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58356, at *20–24 (N.D.
Iowa Aug. 9, 2007); Matter of Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 515 (D. Del. 1996); Pavlick v. Mifflin,
90 F.3d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1996).
173
Ellis, 50 F.3d at 426.
174
Id.
175
See Matter of Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 515 (D. Del. 1996) (citing United States v.
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1995).
170
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question.176 Lastly, in U.S. v. Mitchell, an Eighth Circuit district court held that
the government satisfied the knowing and fraudulent intent element of 18 U.S.C.
§ 152.177 In that case, the defendant’s fraudulent reporting of his income and
preparation of “sham transaction documents, as well as fraudulent tax
returns . . .” was sufficient to secure a conviction.178
The U.S. Supreme court took a more nuanced view of the word
“knowingly”—albeit through analyzing a different statute unrelated to
bankruptcy—when it analyzed 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Section 1028A(a)(1)
states that a person shall be found guilty of aggravated identity theft if she
“knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person . . . .”179 In Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., the Court
held that this statute “requires the Government to show that the defendant knew
that the ‘means of identification’” at issue “belonged to ‘another person.’”180
The court reasoned that “where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most
contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive
verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the
object . . . .”181 If the courts adopted this approach when interpreting this
requirement of the Ellis standard, the government would be required to prove
that the debtor knew the statement she made was false. This conflicts with
Lehming, where the court did not require a person to know she was breaking the
law.182
Another analogous case supporting Christina’s position is MontesRodriguez v. People, where the petitioner was previously “convicted of criminal
impersonation based on his use of a false [SSN] on an application for an
automobile loan” under a Colorado statute that “applies when one assumes a
false identity or a false capacity with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for
himself.”183 The petitioner conceded that he used a false SSN, but “argued that
he did not assume a false identity or capacity under the statute because he applied
for the loan using his proper name[.]”184 The Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the petitioner’s conviction, holding that the petitioner “neither assumed a false
176

Matter of Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 516 (D. Del. 1996).
United States v. Mitchell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58356, at *24–35 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 9, 2007).
178
Id. at *24.
179
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2019).
180
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009).
181
Id. at 650.
182
See Matter of Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 515 (D. Del. 1996) (citing United States v.
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1995).
183
Montes-Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924, 925 (Colo. 2010).
184
Id.
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capacity nor a false identity in violation of the statute.”185 The court noted that
“one assumes a false or fictitious capacity in violation of the statute when he or
she assumes a false legal qualification, power, fitness, or role.”186 Furthermore,
the court reaffirmed an earlier holding, stating that “one assumes a false identity
by holding one’s self out to a third party as being another person.”187 Just as the
petitioner in Montes-Rodriguez used his real name and a false SSN to obtain an
automobile loan, Christina used her real name with a false SSN to obtain
employment. Therefore, as it relates to her identity or capacity, Christina did not
falsely represent herself.
Christina’s submission of her pay stubs is a volitional act that satisfies the
“knowingly” requirement in Lehming.188 However, sufficient evidence does not
exist to support that Christina’s submission is “fraudulent.”189 Unlike the
defendant in Ellis, Christina did not submit these pay stubs in an attempt to
deceive the bankruptcy court and the U.S. Trustee into allowing her to file for
bankruptcy when she otherwise was not eligible to do so. To the contrary,
Christina—as an undocumented debtor—is entitled to file bankruptcy so long as
she satisfies the definition of a “person” in the Code190 and is not prevented from
filing due to a previous discharge. Further, Christina already admitted that she
submitted pay stubs that listed a false SSN when she completed the Form B-121.
Christina is also distinguishable from the defendant in Mitchell, who
submitted false information pertaining to his income, transactions, and tax
returns.191 Although a court may determine that Christina’s submission was false
given that the SSN listed on her pay stubs belongs to someone else, this alone
does not prove that Christina’s intent in submitting these pay stubs was
fraudulent. Rather, her intent in submitting these pay stubs was likely to satisfy
the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 521.192
Furthermore, case law supports the discharge of a petitioner’s debt despite
their use of a false SSN. In McVay v. Perez, the respondent accumulated
$400,000 in debt using a false SSN.193 The Trustee alleged that “[b]y listing a
false [SSN] on his Petition and Statement of Social Security Numbers, the
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Matter of Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 515 (D. Del. 1996).
See id. (citing United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1995).
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2019) (defining “person” to include an individual.)
See United States v. Mitchell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58356, at *24–35 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 9, 2007).
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(4) (2019).
McVay v. Perez (In re Perez), 415 B.R. 445, 449 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009).
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Debtor/Defendant knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath or account
which is material to his bankruptcy case.”194 The court held that the person
whose SSN was used to accumulate this debt had a “right to intervene” in this
bankruptcy proceeding and had to be given notice of such right under FBRP
7024.195 However, absent an objection from that party, the court held that it
would grant a discharge.196 The court granted this debtor a discharge in 2009.197
Thus, it is likely that a court will hold that the government will fail to meet
its burden in satisfying the second, fourth, and sixth elements of the Ellis
standard as they apply to Christina. However, in the case that these elements are
all satisfied, there are still very strong considerations that support allowing
debtors like Christina to file for bankruptcy without being prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. § 152. These considerations are discussed below.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In lieu of using a false SSN, undocumented immigrants are able to file
federal tax returns by using their ITINs.198 ITINs are issued by the IRS “[T]o
individuals who must file taxes, but don’t possess or aren’t eligible for a
[SSN].”199 Any individual who resides and earns income in the United States—
whether they work in the formal or informal sector—is required to pay taxes on
that income.200 The most recent statistics on undocumented immigrants in the
U.S. labor force are reflected in the chart below. The chart shows that “8 million
unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. working or looking for work in 2014,
making up 5% of the civilian labor force . . . .”201

194

Id.
Id. at 45253.
196
Id. at 454.
197
Parker, supra note 61.
198
See Octavio Blanco, Why Undocumented Immigrants Pay Taxes, CNN BUSINESS (Apr. 19, 2017, 6:06
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/04/19/news/economy/undocumented-immigrant-taxes/index.html.
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Id.

Hunter Hallman, How Do Undocumented Immigrants Pay Federal Taxes? An Explainer, BIPARTISAN
POLICY CENTER (Mar. 28, 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/how-do-undocumented-immigrants-payfederal-taxes-an-explainer/.
201
Jeffrey S. Passell & D’Vera Cohn, Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Workforce Stable After the
Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/11/03/size-of-u-sunauthorized-immigrant-workforce-stable-after-the-great-recession/.
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Chart 1: Number of Unauthorized Immigrants in the Labor Force
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The most up-to-date empirical studies show “that about half of
undocumented workers in the United States file income tax returns[,]” as 4.4
million income tax returns were filed in 2017 by persons who did not have
SSNs.203 These filers paid a total of $23.6 billion in income taxes.204 This means
that the filers who did not have SSNs—many of whom are presumably
undocumented immigrants—paid an average of approximately $5,364 to the
IRS.205
Although millions of undocumented immigrants likely pay thousands in
federal income taxes, they are not entitled to the federal benefits that their money
is helping fund. The table below shows that undocumented immigrants are not
completely entitled to any federal benefits. When filing their income taxes,
undocumented immigrants are only entitled to certain tax credits, one of which
is the Child Tax Credit (CTC), which is “a partially refundable credit designed
to support low-income families based on their dependent children.”206 However,
recent legislation has limited the refunding of the CTC “to filers whose
dependents have valid Social Security numbers . . . .” meaning that filers with
undocumented children can no longer receive this credit.207

202

Id.
Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump Says Undocumented Immigrants are an Economic Burden. They
Pay Billions in Taxes, VOX (Oct. 25, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/13/17229018/
undocumented-immigrants-pay-taxes.
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Table 1: What Federal Benefits are Undocumented Immigrants Eligible
For?208
Tax Credits (Refundable)
Ineligible for most tax credits; ITIN
holders with U.S. children can
receive the Child Tax Credit
Pell Grants & Student Loans
Ineligible
Unemployment Insurance
Ineligible
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Ineligible
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Ineligible
Program (SNAP)
Social Security
Ineligible
Medicaid
Emergency service only
Health Care Premium and CostIneligible
Sharing Assistance
Children’s Health Insurance
No federal care; some states cover
Program (CHIP)
for labor and delivery, prenatal, and
postpartum care
These barriers to public benefits are even present after undocumented
immigrants obtain legal status. Even if a previously undocumented immigrant is
able to become a Permanent Resident (i.e., a green card holder) applying for
and/or receiving certain benefits may present consequences. The public charge
ground discussed supra will prohibit Permanent Residents from applying for the
benefits in Table 1 above until five years have passed from the date they became
a permanent resident.209 Therefore, even when immigrants are emigrating to the
U.S. in the “legal” or “right” way, they are still not entitled to the same social
safety net as U.S. citizens. Instead, these “Permanent” Residents are placed on a
five-year probation period, whereby their status may be stripped from them
should they need government aid.
This is problematic for several reasons. First, as mentioned above,
undocumented immigrants provide billions of dollars of federal revenue in the
form of income taxes every year. These taxes are used to fund, among other
things, the programs in Table 1, which U.S. citizens use when they are in need
or fall upon hard times. Second, this barrier bars noncitizens whom have paid
exorbitant filing fees directly to the government. The filing fee for submitting
an adjustment of status application to become a Permanent Resident ranges from
208

Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2019) (“Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry, has become
a public charge . . . is deportable.”); see also Luthra, supra note 81.
209
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$750 to $1,225.210 This does not include filing fees for applications sent directly
to DHS before the submission of an I-485 application. For example, an
undocumented immigrant may have a petition filed on her behalf by a family
member in order to obtain a visa (by filing an I-130 petition) before applying for
permanent residency. The filing fee for such an application is $535.211 These
fees, which total as much as $1,760, pose a great financial strain on someone
seeking to obtain status in the U.S. This strain is exacerbated for those who
already have payment obligations elsewhere, such as obligations arising from
credit obtained to make purchases or receipt of medical services without health
insurance.
In addition to paying federal income taxes, undocumented immigrants also
pay property and sales taxes.212 A recent study found that this population pays
over $11.7 billion in state and local taxes.213 Moreover, undocumented
immigrants working in the formal sector, like Christina, “still have payroll taxes
for Medicare and Social Security withheld from their paycheck, even if they put
a fake [SSN] on their W-2 form.”214 It is estimated that these undocumented
immigrants “pay about $9 billion in payroll taxes annually.”215 A review by the
Social Security Administration (SSA) found that undocumented immigrants
contributed $13 billion in payroll taxes to the Social Security Program.216 The
Chief Actuary of the SSA estimated that “1.8 million immigrants were working
with fake or stolen Social Security cards in 2010”—a number that is expected to
increase to 3.4 million by 2040.217
Given these contributions to the economy, undocumented immigrants
should be entitled to not only the same social welfare benefits as their U.S.
citizen counterparts, but also to the fresh start principle. Christina, and many like

210
See APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR ADJUST STATUS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, I-485, https://www.uscis.gov/i-485.
211
PETITION FOR ALIEN RELATIVE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, I-130,
https://www.uscis.gov/i-130.
212
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her, are “honest but unfortunate”218 debtors who have fallen upon difficult times.
Like many U.S. citizens, she has worked hard and contributed to the U.S.
economy through her labor and income. It follows that she, too, should be
entitled to what the Supreme Court referred to as “a new opportunity in
life . . . unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”219
CONCLUSION
This Comment was written in an attempt to present both a legal and moral
argument in favor of allowing undocumented immigrants working in the formal
sector with false SSNs to file for bankruptcy without facing criminal or
immigration-related consequences. With regard to the “legal” aspect, I expanded
on an issue first presented by Chrystin Ondersma in Undocumented Debtors—
the application of what I have referred to as the “Ellis standard” in determining
whether undocumented immigrants who use false SSNs in obtaining
employment in the formal sector have committed a convictable offense under 18
U.S.C. § 152. Ondersma stated that this was “not clear,” arguing that “[t]urning
in a W-2 with a false SSN does not meet the elements of bankruptcy fraud [under
18 U.S.C. § 152] because unless the debtor is seeking to discharge debt relating
to that SSN, use of the false SSN is neither a material statement nor a material
omission.”220 Ondersma also noted that “[t]urning in a W-2 with a false SSN
does not meet the elements of bankruptcy fraud because unless the debtor is
seeking to discharge debt relating to that SSN” does not satisfy the fourth
element of the Ellis standard, requiring that the statement be related to a material
matter.221
Despite there being no case law on this issue as it pertains to undocumented
immigrants—either before or after the publishing of Undocumented Debtors in
2012—I found myself agreeing with Ondersma after reviewing the case law
related to Ellis. However, after reviewing this pertinent case law, I realized that
a federal prosecutor attempting to convict someone like Christina under 18
U.S.C. § 152 and the Ellis standard faces difficulty meeting her burden under
both the second element (proving that the use of a false SSN is a statement that
is related to a bankruptcy proceeding) as well as the sixth (proving that the
statement was made both knowingly and fraudulently). I hope that further
clarification of the arguments in favor of someone like Christina will lead to
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more undocumented debtors attempting to use the Code without fear of criminal
consequences.
Paving a pathway for undocumented immigrants to file for bankruptcy is the
right thing to do. It is not enough to simply give undocumented debtors the
ability to petition for bankruptcy—which they do possess, since they satisfy the
definition of a “person” under the Code222—but a mechanism should be in place
to quell the justified fear within the undocumented population that availing
themselves to the bankruptcy courts and the U.S. Trustee’s office will not lead
to them being detained or sent back to their country of origin. These are people
that work difficult (and sometimes menial) jobs and contribute to the U.S.
economy and social safety net but are not afforded the same protections as U.S.
citizens. Notwithstanding their contributions, this population is at a severe
handicap, as they do not benefit from federal and state welfare programs that the
rest of the population is privy to when they need financial assistance (as
illustrated in Table 1).
Given negative sentiments toward undocumented immigrants, which
contribute to xenophobic attitudes spewing throughout the U.S. and the rest of
the Western world, it is unlikely that comprehensive immigration reform that
will provide further financial protection for undocumented immigrants will
happen in the near future. Until then, the right thing to do is to provide a pathway
through which those among the undocumented population who fall upon tough
times can achieve a true fresh start.
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